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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES MODIFIES PUNITIVE DAMAGE
AWARD.
The Supreme Court of the United States deferred to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which held that Exxon may be vicariously liable for
punitive damages. The Court also held that the Clean Water Act did not preempt
an award of punitive damages and approved a "1:1 ratio" of compensatory to
punitive damages to guide lower courts.
Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker
Supreme Court of the United States

1 28 S.Ct. 2605
25, 2008)

(Decided June
In March of

1 989 an oil supertanker, EXXON VALDEZ, grounded on a reef outside the Alaskan

Coast, fracturing its hull and spilling millions of gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. The
wreck was due to a breach of duty of Exxon Shipping Company ("Exxon") and the ship's captain,
Joseph Hazelwood ("Hazelwood"). The spill damaged the surrounding environment so badly that both
the federal and Alaskan government sued, as well as surrounding fishermen, property owners and other
private parties. This action consolidated the remaining plaintiffs' ("Baker") civil suits against Exxon,
Hazelwood, and others. The length and breadth of the issues and law in this case led the district court,
and subsequently the United States Supreme Court, to break the trial into three phases.
During the first phase ("Phase I") of the trial the district court "considered Exxon and
1
Hazelwood's recklessness and thus their potential for punitive liability." The evidence admitted by the
2
plaintiff on this issue at trial was fairly damning for both defendants. On appeal to separate itself from
Hazelwood's acts, Exxon claimed that the trial judge erred while instructing the jury that "a corporation
'is responsible for the reckless acts of ... employees ... in a managerial capacity while acting in the

scope of their employment,"' and urged the court not to predicate liability based on his conduct. 3 Exxon
maintained that because it did not direct, countenance, or participate with its underlings it should be

immune from punitive damages.4

To support this argument Exxon cited

The Amiable Nancy, which held that a shipowner was not
Lake

liable for the marine trespass of the crew that was operating his ship. 5 Exxon further argued, citing

Shore

& MS.

Ry. Co.

v.

Prentice, that "[t]hough [a] principle is liable to make compensation for

[intentional torts] by his agent, he is not liable to be punished by exemplary damages for an intent in

which he did not participate." 6 It maintained that, even if the case does not control, Lake
is still alive in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

Shore's legacy
1 964. 7 Baker responded to both the Amiable Nancy

1

Exxon Shipping Co., et al. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008).
Against Hazelwood, the plaintiffs introduced evidence that he was "down[ing] at least five double vodkas in the waterfront
bars of Valdez," that he was a recovering alcoholic who was in relapse, and that at the time of the spill his blood-alcohol level
was around .241, among other things. Id. at 2612-14. Plaintiff also introduced evidence that Exxon knew about
Hazelwood's relapse, that Exxon's officials often drank with Hazelwood, and that Hazelwood was not complying with the
company sponsored treatment program. Id. at 2612.
3 Id. at 2615 (citing App. K to P et. For Cert. 301a; Brief for Respondents 36-39). The Courts of Appeals have split on this
issue. Id.
2

4

Id.
Exxon Shipping, 128 S.Ct at 2615.
6 Id. at 2615-16 (citing Lake Shore & MS. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 110 (1893)).
7Id. at 2616 (noting that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not subject employers to punitive damages based on
discriminatory conduct of their managerial employees as long as the employer has "maintained and enforced good-faith
antidiscrimination policies").
5

1

and

Lake Shore cases by stating that defendant's reliance on the former case is improper because it cites

dictum, and distinguishing the latter case since it dealt with lower level employees such as railroad
8
conductors rather than managing agents like a ship's captain. Baker also urged the court to conform to
the land-based common law of a majority of states which would allow punitive damages for the conduct
9
of managerial agents. The Supreme Court remained divided on this question, and deferred to the Ninth
10
Circuit's opinion.
However, the Su reme Court noted that the determination of this issue does not
1
affect the derivative liability question.

p

Moving to the second phase (Phase II) of the trial, the court considered the issue of whether or
12
not the Clean Water Act (CWA) preempts an award of common law punitive damages. The trial court
awarded both compensatory and punitive damages.

In finding that the C WA did not preempt punitive

damages, the court looked to the policy behind the act, which is to protect "the navigable waters of the
13
The court also noted that Congress
United States, adjoining shorelines, ... [and] natural resources."
did not intend to remove common law punitive damages because, when it enacted the C WA, it did not
14
directly address the issue.
In the third and final phase of trial (Phase III), the trial court heard the issue of punitive damages,
specifically investigated the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the magnitude of harm, the
15
defendant's fin ancial condition and any mitigating facts.
The trial court eventually awarded punitive
damages against both defendants, and, on appeal, Exxon challenged the seemingly exorbitant amount
awarded. The appellate court discussed the lengthy history and rationale behind punitive damages, and
ultimately provided instructions to the trial court with respect to recalculating the punitive damages
16
award on remand.
It explained that a single 1:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive damages "is
appropriate in all but the most exceptional of cases, and '[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial,
17
then a lesser ratio ... can reach the outermost limit of what due process can guarantee."
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8 Id.

9
IO

Id. (discussing that the Restatement advocates this approach).
Id.
1
1 Exxon Shipping, 128 S.Ct at 2616.
12 33 u.s.c. §§ 1251-1376.
13 Exxon Shipping, 128 S.Ct at 2618 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)).
14 Id. at 2619.
1 5 Id. (citing App. Brief in Opposition 15a). On this issue the jury awarded plaintiffs damages in an amount exceeding $5

billion. The circuit court reduced these damages by half.
16 Id. at 2619-2634.
The decision to remand based on punitive damages is debatable. Justices Scalia, Thomas, Stevens,
Ginsberg and Breyer all have differing opinions about how this issue should be treated. See id. at 2634-2641 (Scalia, J.,
concurring; Stevens, J., Ginsberg, J., and Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17 Id. at 2634 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)).

2

